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Introduction
Terms like technology, technological change, and technological improvements may
seem to have simple definitions. Alas! They are not. In fact, the perimeter of
technology is not so easy to grasp. Technology is usually divided into inventions and
innovations, and innovations into product innovations and process innovations.
Inventions in themselves need not become innovations, or may take time before they
do. If an invention has not become a part of some business process it cannot be said
that such an invention has any economic influence. On the other hand, an invention
that has been a part of a business process has economic impact, and may be
considered as innovation.
In Economics, term ‘technology’ has been widely used and had been taken to
carry a wide range of subjects such as technological change, technical progress,
technical capacity, technology transfer, technology diffusion, productivity and
productivity change, etc. These concepts have been used in context of economic
development in a variety of ways. Development literature is crowded with theoretical
and policy details. Most writers have been interested in connecting various aspects of
technology with major changes in the production and distribution of wealth, income
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and economic power within a country. Technology has been seen as a determinant
factor in economic development of developing countries. Therefore, economists
have treated the subject with various degrees of interest and depth.
First section of the paper deals with theoretical background of technology creation
and technology transfer. The second and third sections deal with specific issues of
thechnology transfer (FDI) and technology creation (R&D) respectively. The fourth
section gives model description, and the fifth section gives the results of the research.
Background
The first instance in history where a society broke through from agrarian society to
industrial domination is associated with the First Industrial Revolution. How big was
the difference between the life before the First Industrial Revolution, sometimes
compared to the change after discovery of fire, is coined in Landes’ words (2003: 5):
‘…the Englishmen of 1750 was closer in material things to Caesar’s legionnaires
than to his own great-grand-children.’
Even in 18th century, Adam Smith (1776) recognized new technologies as very
important in process of growth and development. It was viewed as the engine of
growth in terms of per capita income. Furthermore, he stressed the division of labour
to be one of the key issues due to three different circumstances. First one is dexterity
of every particular workman; second, saving of time, commonly lost in passing from
one species of work to another; and third, the invention of a number of machines
which facilitate and abridge labour and enable one man to do the work of many.
We have seen that new inventions and innovations are not adopted automatically
with their discovery. It takes time for invention or innovation to be diffused in an
economy. There are few factors that influence this slow down in technology
implementation. One is the efficiency of the old technology. It may be so that old
technology is cost efficient and owners are reluctant to change it because they are still
making profits. Furthermore, the old technology may be improved so as to be more
efficient than before, stopping the new technology to enter. This may happen even
though the new technology may be more efficient than the old one. This effect is
called the ‘sailing ship’ effect. On the other hand, some technologies become useful
after series of innovations, e.g. the steam engine, where it took some 100 years to
come from the invention to railroad. Once the railroad was established diffusion was
fast.
Young (1993) suggest that most new technologies are initially broadly inferior to
the older technologies they seek to replace and are only competitive in a narrow range
of specialised functions. Subsequent improvements that take place over time allow
new technologies to ultimately dominate. For example, the steam engine of James
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Watt in 1765 was at the time crudely engineered piston, which was used mainly in the
mines for pumping water. In terms of provision of power, it was not a substitute for
widely used water wheel. It was after the innovations by John Wilkinson1 in 1776 and
William Murdock2 in 1781 that the steam engine was useful for converting vertical
motion into rotary force. Only after these inventions the steam engine became
generally useful source of power.
Some authors consider technology to be a very pulp term that is hardly definable.
Radoševiæ (1999) is of the view that technology as a concept has no clear boundaries,
and where generation and diffusion process is deeply embedded in the institutional
fabric of economy and society. The forms of technology may vary according to the
level of disembodiment from patents and licences to those embodied into machines
or persons, i.e. tacit knowledge.
Even the most important inventions had a very modest impact initially. The full
potential developed and materialised only after the potential of a technology was
explored. This was often done through using the technologies themselves and as they
become cheaper and widely diffused. One example is the ‘social savings’. This
stipulates reduction in real resource costs, and an estimate for the steam engine
suggests it to be at no more than 0.2 percent of GDP in 1800. However, usage of the
steam engine in terms of horsepower was 35,000 in the year 1800 and about two
million in 1870. By 1870, the implications of the steam engine were fully realised and
social savings went up to about 3.5 percent of GDP, excluding the larger impact of
the railways (Crafts, 1998).
Abramovitz (1986) attributes technological backwardness to the social conditions
of a country, where tenacious societal characteristics attribute for a portion of a
country’s failure to achieve the level of productivity of more advanced economies.
He coined the term ‘social capability’. When social capability is incorporated, it
follows that a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward
without qualifications, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially
advanced.
On the same line as Abramovitz (1986) with ‘social capability’, Hall and Jones
(1998) developed the hypothesis of social infrastructure. In their hypothesis it is
argued that differences in capital accumulation, productivity and thus output per
worker are fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructure among
countries. The social infrastructure in this context is defined as ‘institutions and
government policies that determine the economic environment within which
individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output. A
social infrastructure favourable to high levels of output per worker provides an
environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital
accumulation, skill acquisition, invention, and technology transfer.’ It is further
argued that the social infrastructure has the right price when private returns capture
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social returns. However, even though the government is the most influential provider
of social infrastructure that protects against diversion (e.g. thievery, squatting,
Mafia), it is in practice a prime source of diversion throughout the world:
‘Regulations and laws may protect against diversion, but they all too often constitute
the chief vehicle of diversion in an economy.’ Countries with high levels of
corruption among government officials are likely to have severe constraints in trade,
poor contract enforcement, and government intervention in production will not be
able to achieve income level associated with Western Europe, North America or
Eastern Asia.
While the problem of knowledge creation is a problem in some Asian and African
countries, the same cannot be said for the transition countries. However, both groups
of countries share the disproportion in creation of new knowledge. Furthermore, in
Central and Eastern Europe, the accumulated stock of knowledge is significant, but it
is not utilised. Thus, creation of knowledge by itself does not automatically mean a
country will benefit from it. Much of the research and development (R&D) in
ex-communist countries went on military research. While the military R&D may
have spin-off effect in other areas, it seems that these countries did not benefit from it
to a greater extent.
The advances of today’s developed countries after the World War II in Europe
have shown unprecedented growth performance. It is argued that this performance
was due to the backlog of unexploited technology. This is particularly viewed in the
light of methods already in use in the US, but has not been employed. Here, the US
can be seen as the leader and other countries as followers. However, the initial
backlog and its reduction with time cannot be a sole explanation for either
speeding-up or slowdown, but it constitutes an important part.
It can be seen that mere technology is not enough, but rather it is support for social
advancement that should prelude before advantages from technological advances can
be achieved. This is one of the issues that some countries (e.g. Eastern Europe and
ex-USSR) have not capitalised in terms of faster productivity growth in situation
where the backlog of technology was very much present. For Western Europe and
Japan it can be said that they were able to exploit the backlog into their own
advantage for rapid productivity growth. However, the capacity for a country to
change may vary over time. The existing technology may be fully exploited with
educational content, but it does not necessary present the foundation and
requirements for change.
When a country moves from lower to higher technology level, the cost of moving
from one level to another is an increasing function of the level of technology already
in use. On the other hand, as country develops, the speed of development slows down
as country reaches higher levels of development. This is so because changes required
for advancement are more infrequent (Ames, Rosenberg, 1963).
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In the case that advanced technology is largely scale-dependent, with further
obstacles to trade, political obstacles etc., which prove to be important, large
countries will have a stronger potential for growth than smaller countries
(Abramovitz, 1986).
Young (1993) stresses the fact of limited possibility of any given technology and
knowledge. With invention of new technology comes learning, by virtue of
experience, by which the productive potential is further explored and innovations
follow. However, after a certain time limitations (physical) of a technology are
reached in terms of productivity and learning will slow down, and even ultimately
stop. If there is absence of new technological advances and introduction of new
technological processes, it is likely that any given environment has simply a finite
amount of knowledge to be serendipitously acquired from experience in productive
activity, as opposed to purposeful investigation.
Abramovitz (1993) notes a two-way connection between technological progress
and economies of scale, tangible capital accumulation, and human and other
intangible capital accumulation. The interdependence is stipulated by Arrow (1962)
and his hypothesis on learning by doing, and learning by using by Rosenberg (1982).
Views expressed by Arrow and Rosenberg deal with the contributions of experience
with new way of doing things, thus with the effects of past technological progress.
Technology Transfer
Ever since economies took off from agricultural to industrial, and some even to
information, societies, technology transfer was an option for faster catch-up
possibility. Economists have supported this idea with a question in mind. Why the
developing countries fail to resolve their development problems when technology
can be transferred? This question was posed by H. W. Singer (1965) where he
stressed the importance of technology transfer as a strategy for development. He
supported the idea with the fact that the US and Germany developed faster than the
UK, where industrial development took place first. The impossibility of developing
countries to resolve their problems is attributed here to high population growth, and
the other is the severe disproportion of knowledge creation among countries. While
the problem of high population is distinct in Africa and Asia, it cannot be said the
same for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, number of Asian
countries have succeeded in technology transfer, and knowledge creation (Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and more recently, China, Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia), and Central European Countries are stepping up the pace, especially in
the light of EU enlargement, but African countries still lag far behind. On the second
account, knowledge creation is disproportionate in favour of developed countries.
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Sachs (2000) points out that only 15 percent of total world population provides
almost all technology innovations, while the part accounting for some half of the
world population are able to adopt new technologies, leaving the rest of the world
technologically disconnected.
In terms of transfer of technology from leader to a follower country, situation is
similar to diffusion of technology in one country. The process is far from automatic.
While some simple technologies can be readily transferred, and some with greater
difficulty when substantial knowledge endowments are necessary, still one
technology is not likely to work in different geographical location in the same way.
The example here is one in Egypt (Landes, 1998), where it was decided after World
War II to invest in cotton-spinning mills. The idea seemed reasonable and foolproof.
After all, Egypt grew finest long-fibre cotton in the world and cotton-spinning mills
seemed as done deal in order to gain some value added from cotton, and not just from
export of cotton. However, the yarn produced there was not of international quality.
Furthermore, other growers of cotton found ways to improve their raw cotton and
weavers looked for ways to make high quality cloth with poorer brands of cotton. In
the end Egyptians were stuck with poor cloth for home market, and lost part of the
export markets for raw cotton.
As Landes (1998) points out, ‘even in later ages of scientific diffusion and
transparency, even with sample products and equipment, even with blueprints and
explicit instructions, some know-how can be learned only by experience’. This is
what Michael Polanyi (1967) calls tacit knowledge, Kenneth Arrow (1962) refers to
it as learning by doing, and Adam Smith (1776) labels dexterity.
Radoševiæ (1999) points out a historical dimension of technology transfer. We
have seen the importance of the movement of people as a key element for technology
transfer during the industrialization of Europe and the US. However, there are limits
to which these elements of industrialization in terms of technology transfer can be an
insight for today’s developing countries. The measurement of migrations of
researchers and engineers, and understanding of their contribution to their home
countries produce little beyond anecdotal evidence.
Radoševiæ (1999) further distinguishes four aspects of new technologies whose
characteristics have implications for technology policy, and technology transfer
policy in particular. These are: (1) the rising complexity of technical change; (2)
changing appropriability and transferability of new technologies; (3) increasing
knowledge intensity of new technologies and production; and (4) the increasing
significance of organizational change. The mentioned aspects of technology
transferred are labelled with a change from predominant electromechanical
industries to dominantly electronics based technologies. This trend toward electronic
has shifted ways of learning and technology transfer which has profound influence
on the ways learning and technology transfer policies are created. In this light it is
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important to understand institutional framework and policies that have been
satisfactory in some previous period do not have to be effective at present.
Even though we have mentioned many aspects of technology transfer, some of
them are not easily quantifiable. Furthermore we will see what where and what the
major technology transfer mechanisms today are. We already mentioned some of
them, but we will stick here to those quantifiable where some aspects of not so
quantifiable effects can come into play as well. Here we will distinguish foreign
direct investments (FDI) and take a look at the aspects of technology transfer through
this mean. Furthermore, we will distinguish why we think the FDI worth analysing in
the aspect of technology transfer.
Gains from FDI by the recipient country are not merely capital and foreign
exchange. There are further benefits to FDI inflows in the shape of managerial
abilities, technical knowledge, technical personnel, technological knowledge,
administrative organization, and innovations in products and processes. The
knowledge that foreign capital may provide is of great benefit to the recipient
country. The importance of such knowledge stems from the fact that such knowledge
may provide a successful tool in closing a managerial and technological gap. These
benefits may be treated as ‘private technical assistance’. Furthermore, such technical
assistance and the demonstration effect accompanying the assistance may positively
influence other sectors of an economy, or spur positive movements in areas where
FDI is being implemented (Arrow, 1962).
The new techniques that enter an economy through FDI, by the example they set,
promote the diffusion of technology in the recipient economy, which plays a
significant role in economic development process. In a model of technology
diffusion, usually the growth rate of a developing country depends on the extent to
which it can adopt technologies already in use in developed countries, or to be more
precise, in technologically leading countries (Borensztein, De Gregorio, Lee, 1998).
Technology diffusion can take place through a variety of channels that involve the
transmission of ideas and new technologies. Imports of high technology products,
adoption of foreign technology and acquisition of human capital through various
means are certainly important conduits for the international diffusion of technology.
Beside these channels, foreign direct investment by multinational corporations
(MNCs) is considered to be a major channel for the access to advanced technologies
by developing countries (UN, 2002).
Research provided by Findley (1978) states that FDI increases the rate of
technical progress in the host economy through a ‘contagion’ effect from the more
advanced technologies, management, practices, etc., used by foreign firms. Research
by Wang (1990) is more in the line with neoclassical growth framework, by assuming
that the increase in ‘knowledge’, applied to production is determined as a function of
foreign direct investment. Furthermore, research conducted by Balasubramanyam,
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Salisu and Sapsford (1996) suggest that due to the spill-over effects and externalities
associated with FDI (as opposed to domestic investment) it is expected that for the
export oriented countries foreign investment is a more powerful driving force in the
growth process than domestic investments.
The opening up of previously closed economies of Central and Eastern Europe
changes models and patterns of how economies are integrated into the global
economy. Prior to 1990s, these countries were linked to the global economy
predominantly through trade, with the import of equipment and licenses serving as a
main vehicle of technology transfer. Now there is whole range of mechanism at their
disposal. Simple trade, FDI and the various forms of minority equity or non-equity
type of relationships are possible vehicles for technology transfer.
Before the transition process started, and at the early stages of transition, foreign
investors were mostly concentrated on joint ventures (JVs). It is estimated that over
the period 1988-1990 the number of JVs in these countries rose from 383 to over
10000. In practice, this was very much a transitional phase and many of these JVs
transformed into direct investment after 1990 (Radoševiæ, Dyker, 1997).
Figures for CEEC (see figure 1) reveal dramatic developments in the earlier stages
of the transition process. We can see that things went from bad to worse until 1992,
with a recovery period up until 1995, when the region entered a positive growth rate
pattern. All transition countries experienced a transition slump during the first half of
the 1990s. In other words, FDI inflows were not nearly enough to offset the negative
trends associated with transition. Thus, the data shows a negative trend between the
two variables up until 1992. Naturally, increasing growth rates cannot be attributed
solely to FDI inflows, but rather to improved conditions in countries accompanied by
an increase in FDI inflows. We can also see a positive trend in both FDI inflows and
GDP growth collapses after 1996. Since that year, we observe contradictory trends in
FDI inflows and GDP growth. However, the impact of FDI does not, and more
importantly, is not likely, to influence GDP in the year of implementation, but rather
after a certain time lapse. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the
effects of FDI using the descriptive analysis only.
The growth rates for this region are likely to increase in the next few years,
according to IMF (2003) data. In 2002, the growth rate remained steady at 4.27
percent, and increased to 4.87 percent in 2003, and a slight drop to 4.3 percent in 2004
is forecasted. Whether this is a positive indicator of FDI growth remains to be seen.
However, investors are more likely to invest in those countries where policies are
oriented towards long-run lasting reforms, rather than to countries with temporary
higher growth rates, but no serious long-term reforms, which may lead to lower
growth rates in the long-term.
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Figure 1: FDI Inflows and Real Growth Rates of GDP in CEEC, 1990-2003
Source: World Bank, 2005.
R&D
Like many authors, Goto and Suzuki (1989) point out that technology possesses
characteristics of public good in the sense that an additional user without additional
cost can consume it. The usual diffusion channels include licensing, reverse
engineering, academic and trade journals, and/or turnover of researchers.
As argued by Bania, Eberts and Fogarty (1993), the incentive for firms to engage
in R&D is to increase innovations and productivity growth. Furthermore, the
incentives also exist as firms appropriate information from other firms and
institutions performing R&D, including universities. It is further argued here that
geographic proximity may facilitate spillovers and shorten the time between
invention and innovation. Benefit for local firms is in region’s technical
infrastructure in many ways. Graduates are hired from local universities, local firms
may use consultants from local universities, or they can engage in university-industry
joint research centres. Local firms may use universities for education and training of
their work force or utilise university facilities, e.g. laboratories, libraries, specialised
equipment and by attending seminars. The clear-cut case of spillovers is hiring labour
from local universities that embody fruits of academic research, education and
training.
As suggested by Helpman and Coe (1995), in the light of openness to international
trade in goods and services, FDI, and international exchange of information and
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dissemination of knowledge, a country’s productivity depends both on its own R&D
and on the R&D by its trade partners. A country’s own R&D efforts produce traded
and nontraded goods and services that induce more effective use of existing resources
and thus raise productivity levels. On the other hand, own R&D makes acceptance
benefits from foreign technical advances possible. The more a country is able to take
advantage of these benefits the more productivity it becomes. Furthermore, the
benefits of foreign R&D can be direct and indirect. Direct benefits are those which
relate to learning about new technologies and materials, production processes, or
organisational methods, while indirect benefits stem from imports of goods and
services that have been developed by trade partners. In both cases the foreign R&D
affects a country’s productivity.
Griliches (1997) points out that education becomes more valuable in periods of
rapid technological change due to rising price of ‘skill’ as the result of a technology
induced rising demand for it. Furthermore, in conventional measure of education per
worker is limited by the finiteness of the measure itself, and more substantially by the
finiteness of human life. This is the reason why education cannot be a source of
indefinite growth if externalities are produced by education. These externalities
encompass direct accumulation via investment in science and R&D, and indirect
effects via learning by doing and other knowledge spillovers.
In terms of organizational capacities to perform R&D, we have seen that by the
outbreak of the Second World War there was extensive research network with
organized research laboratories along with the related institutions in government,
university and industry. The researchers in said institutions were employed on a full
time basis. As any other industry, R&D industry can be a subject to an economic
analysis, with recognition of some unique characteristics. The ‘output’ of a research
process is a flow of new knowledge, both of general character (basic research) or
specific application (applied research). The output may be incorporated as flow of
models, sketches, designs, manuals and prototypes for new products, or of pilot
plants and experimental rigs for new processes (experimental development)
(Freeman, Soete, 1997).
As stipulated by Romer (2001) once a particular knowledge has been discovered,
its marginal cost for an additional user is zero. This would suggest the rental price of
knowledge in a competitive market to be zero. However, in this case creation of
knowledge would not be motivated by private economic gains. The conclusion here
is that either knowledge is sold at above its marginal cost or market forces do not
motivate its development. Therefore, competitive model cannot be fully applied here.
However, there is another possibility. Although knowledge is non-rival in essence, it
can be excludable. This is the case when we are able to prevent others from using it.
The excludability in the case of knowledge will depend both on the nature of the
knowledge itself and on law, regulations and institutions governing property rights.
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In conventional thinking of economists, R&D is seen as generating one product:
new information. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) suggest additional aspect, where R&D
is not only generation of new information, but also enhancement of the firm’s ability
to assimilate and exploit existing information. It is further argued that R&D
obviously generates innovations, however, at the same time it also develops the
firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment.
This is also called a firm’s ‘learning’ or ‘absorptive’ capacity. On these lines, a firm’s
ability to imitate fits into the scope of absorptive capacity, but it also includes the
firm’s ability to exploit outside knowledge of a more intermediate sort. This includes
basic research findings that provide the basis for subsequent applied research and
development.
Regarding the size of firms and their involvement in R&D ventures, Mansfield3
(1981) argues that in most industries increases in size of firms are associated with
more than proportional increases in the amount spent on basic research. More
specific, a 1 percent increase in a firm’s sales is associated with about a 1.65 percent
increase in basic research expenditure. However, there is evidence that in most
industries increases in firm size are associated with less than proportional increases in
the amount spent on R&D projects aimed at entirely new products and processes. To
be more specific, a 1 percent increase in a firm’s sales seems to be associated with
about a 0.78 percent increase in the amount spent on such projects. So, the largest
firms carry out disproportionately large share of the basic research in most industries.
However, there is no tendency for the same firms to carry out disproportionately
larger but smaller share of R&D aimed at entirely new products and processes. This is
not contradictory because basic research and R&D aimed at entirely new products
and processes are not one and the same thing. Furthermore, results provided by
Mansfield suggest that innovative output seems to be directly related to the
percentage of R&D expenditure going for basic research.
The models that incorporate R&D directly are mostly related to the new growth
theory. The basis of such thinking is the plausibility of the fact that technological
progress is the reason that more output can be created today than with the same inputs
(capital and labour) a century ago. Furthermore, there are some simplifications that
have to be taken into consideration. The functions are generalised Cobb-Douglas
functions, and in the spirit of Solow, fractions of labour and capital used in the R&D
sector are exogenous and constant (e.g. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), and Aghion and Howit (1992)).
On traditional lines, R&D capital represents the stock of knowledge a firm of an
industry possess in a certain point in time. This capital is combined with other inputs
to produce output. The accumulation process of R&D proceeds through R&D efforts
of a firm or an industry, which depreciates over time and eventually becomes
obsolete due to changes in external circumstances, development of superior
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techniques or products by other firms or institutions. Furthermore there is the decline
in the appropriability of knowledge as it diffuses. The obsolescence of R&D capital is
interesting in itself. As argued by Pakes and Schankerman (1984), the rate of
obsolescence of R&D capital must be higher than that of physical capital because it
depreciates and becomes obsolete, not only because new knowledge replaces old
knowledge, but also because the appropriability of knowledge decreases as the
diffusion takes place. To a certain extent, the rate of obsolescence of R&D capital
reflects the rate of replacement of the old knowledge by new knowledge. This may in
turn reflect advancement in knowledge creation, and it can additionally indicate the
amount of replacement investment in R&D.
Model Specification, Data and Variables
In this section we move to more formal inference about technology. It is know from
the discussion above that production of knowledge is unequally distributed among
nations. As argued by Keller (2004), most countries have foreign sources of
technology that is attributed to their productivity growth. On the other hand, there is
only a minority of rich countries that account for most of the world’s creation of new
technology. The G-7 countries account for some 84 percent of the world’s R&D
spending, but their share in world GDP is only 64 percent. One of the major channels
for technology diffusion is FDI, along with international trade. However, effects of
international trade will not be included in our formal analysis, but the analysis of FDI
is provided in this research.
On the account of more direct measures of technologies there are several
approaches to this problem. As stipulated by Keller (2004), technology is an
intangible that is difficult to measure directly; however, there are three widely used
approaches. These are inputs (R&D), outputs (patents), and the effect of technology
(higher productivity). Regarding the data on R&D, not too many countries report
substantial amounts of R&D. Because this measure capture primarily resources spent
towards innovation, with omitted resources spent on imitation and adoption of
technology, the data for R&D cannot typically be analysed for middle and poor
countries. However, the data on R&D becomes more available as countries income’s
rise. There is further information because surveys include R&D conducted by
affiliates of multinational companies located abroad. One important aspect of R&D is
that the returns on publicly funded R&D are lower than the returns to privately
funded R&D. In our analysis, R&D data will be used for countries that are
converging to high-income group, with some already there.
Even though there are limitations on the part of data used here, this does not
invalidate overall conclusions, given limitations that will be provided in the analysis.
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Even though countries of CEE cannot be said to produce significant portion of
R&D, but rather could be seen as adopters of foreign technologies, it is important to
see the influence of R&D on selected economies. Some authors stipulate that R&D
analysis should not be done for middle and poor countries. However, there is strong
presence of multinationals in most selected countries, so there is increasing
information in R&D activity. Since sampled countries have strong R&D
backgrounds the analysis of the same is welcome on this account also.
All countries in the sample have had sound foundations in their education policies
for science. Why is this fact important? It is often argued that, for example Germany
in the post World War II period experienced tremendous expansion due to backlog of
educated labour force. This education stemmed from the pre-war years. In the same
way, science potential in CEE countries may be viewed in this light.
The second line of reasoning may be seen in increased ability of countries to
transfer and implement advanced technologies from the technology frontier
countries. R&D activity and FDI certainly contribute to the ability of a country to
make the most of foreign technologies. Thus, there is ground to perform analysis
using R&D figures for the selected sample of CEE countries.
The data source used for the analysis is World Development Indicators Database
(World Bank, 2005). Countries being tested are selected CEE countries that have
joined the EU in May 2004, or are negotiating to enter by 2010 or earlier. Namely,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
The following data is used for the analysis: exports of goods and services
(constant 2000 US$); GDP (constant 2000 US$); gross capital formation (% of GDP)
(formerly gross domestic investment), employment, foreign direct investment (%
GDP), research and development expenditure (% of GDP).
The hypothesis being tested is that FDI has significant influence on GDP of CEE
countries. Furthermore, as suggested by the theory above, the influence of FDI
should be greater than that of domestic investment. As we have seen, FDI has become
the main vehicle of technology transfer. Thus, this effect should make FDI even more
significant for recipient economies. Furthermore, it is often stressed that FDI has an
impact on the domestic entities through demonstration and contagion effects; thus,
indirectly boosting productivity and technology advances in environments where
FDI has come.
It should also be noted that countries differ in their ability to create and absorb
technology. CEE countries generally fit into countries able to assimilate foreign
technology to a greater extent and show some ability to create knowledge on their
own.
The model derived here to test mentioned hypothesis stems from a production
function where FDI is introduced as an input in addition to labour and domestic
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capital. The FDI variable is introduced in order to capture the effects of externalities,
demonstration and spillover effects associated with FDI. Exports are also included as
the addition to the production function4. The production function can be written as
Y f L K F X t ( , , , , ) (1)
Y = real GDP
L = labour
K = domestic capital
F = foreign capital
X = exports
t = time trend
It is assumed that (1) is linear in logs. Due to well-known problems of measuring
capital stock, FDI and domestic investment will be measured as a share of GDP.
Procedures used for the analysis is panel data fixed effects estimation so we have:
y l I Y FDI Y x a u
it it it it it i it
          1 2 3 4 5( / ) ( / ) (2)
where lower case letters represent growth rates of respective variables and the
parameters
j
represent output elasticities of labour, domestic capital, foreign capital
and exports respectively. In (2) i denotes the country and t denotes the time period.
The variable a
i





is referred to as unobserved or fixed effect. Furthermore, in application it
may be referred to as unobserved heterogeneity (in our case country heterogeneity).
The other part of the error term, u
it
is often called the idiosyncratic error or




The second hypothesis tested here is that R&D as an input in the production
function has positive influence on output. From the methodological definition of
R&D, we know it consists of both applied and basic research. It is well known that
appropriability of basic research extends longer in time (if ever) than the of applied
research. Furthermore, as both private and public expenditures are contained jointly
in the data, it should be noted that the returns to publicly funded R&D is lower than
the return to privately funded R&D. In the absence of data that divides along
private-public or basic-applied research, the joint data will be used here.
The models derived here to test mentioned hypothesis stems from a production
function where R&D is introduced as an input in addition to labour and domestic
capital. The R&D variable is introduced in order to capture the effects of research
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activity on the performance of selected economies. The production function can be
written as
Y f L K R D t ( , , & , ) (3)
Y = real GDP
L = labour
K = domestic capital
R&D = research and development expenditures
t = time trend
It is assumed that (3) is linear in logs and by using panel with first differencing we
get the determinants of GDP growth where lower case letters represent growth rates
of respective variables and the parameters 
j
represent output elasticities of labour,
domestic capital, and R&D. Due to well-known problems of measuring capital, R&D
and domestic investment will be measured as a share of GDP. These adjustments
yield the following equation:
y l I Y R D Y x a u
it it it it it i it
          1 2 3 4 5( / ) ( & / ) (9)
Following the discussion in previous sections we expect the parameter 4 , the
elasticity of output with respect to R&D to be positive. We can view R&D as
knowledge capital and domestic investment as physical capital. Furthermore, we will
introduce lags to (R&D/Y) variable in order to investigate whether lags yield
additional information. As already mentioned, returns to research are expected
within three to five years. Naturally, this is true for applied research, but it is
controversial for basic research. Similarly as with the fixed effects estimation,
unobserved heterogeneity,, is differenced away.
Empirical Results and Discussion
The results related to technology transfer measured through FDI is shown in table 1.
Why did we choose the different time intervals? First interval, 1990-2002, has
more data and represents the start of the transition process in respective countries,
which includes transition slump. Second interval, 1993-2002, represents a sample
when most of the selected countries started to come out of the transition slump, which
was dominant in all transition countries. Third interval, 1995-2003, represents a
sample for the period when most transition countries have stabilised and started to
attract more FDI, which was not the case during the transition slump, except in
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Hungary. The last interval, 1998-2002, represents an interval when the structure of
FDI started to change from dominantly privatisation related, and market and resource
seeking to more efficiency seeking.
Table 1: Analysis of Determinants of real GDP in CEE

















































Notes: Figures in brackets are respective standard error values. A single asterisk denotes an
estimated coefficient, which is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level, and
double asterisk denotes significance at the 1 per cent level. R2 from estimating using fixed
effects is interpreted as the amount of time variation in the yit that is explained by the time
variation in the explanatory variables.
Serial correlation AR(1) was detected using Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in
panel data. Due to this fact, autoregressive fixed effects model was used. Furthermore, this
model allows unbalanced panel with unequally spaced observations (Baltagi, Wu, 1999; Im,
Pesaran, Shin, 2003), which is characteristic of used panel. The procedure uses
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation.
Testing for unit root was done using the Fisher type unit root test for panel data developed by
Maddala and Wu (1999), using Phillips-Perron procedure. Test results showed variables to be
stationary. Results of the Hausman test yield fixed effects as appropriate.
Furthermore, the data sample is relatively small due to a short time period
available and number of countries. The estimates will be probably much better in few
years time when longer time series become available. Additionally, it will be possible
to construct estimates for respective countries separately, which now yield
coefficients that are not significantly different from zero. The data after 1995 is likely
to yield better and more accurate results, so this remains to be investigated in the next
period when data becomes available.
As we can see from the estimates in the table above, we did not confirm the
hypothesis of greater efficiency of foreign capital compared to domestic capital.
Elasticities of GDP with respect to domestic investment are greater than that of
foreign capital in all equations.
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Estimated equations show similar result for all sampled periods. However, the
coefficient for FDI/Y has diminishing trend as the sample becomes shorter. This
trend is not due to smaller data sample only, but rather due to different type of FDI
entering countries and it captures the fact that the spillover effect is taking place.
Greenfield investments are likely to have greater initial effect than privatisation
related FDI. Furthermore, it is likely that the contagion and demonstration effects
along with technology transfer have set in on a larger scale by the end of 1990s.
Would have a lagged variable for FDI/Y made any difference? This option was
explored as well, but the lagged variable did not reveal anything new. Coefficient for
FDI/Yt-1 was found to be marginally negative. Naturally, the model as a whole did not
hold so this approach was abandoned.
Are the conclusions from tables above surprising? Not entirely. Naturally, it
cannot be concluded that FDI has no positive influence for recipient economies; thus,
the results show that there are some other variables influencing GDP stronger than
ones selected in the model. However, these factors cannot be easily captured.
First factor that could explain the results of the analysis is aforementioned
transition slump. Although there were FDI flowing into respective countries, growth
performance was not significantly affected, thus, FDI inflow was not of such
magnitude in the beginning of the transition process to reverse negative effects of
transition. By the end of 1990s some countries experienced recessions which
coincided with the sale of some valuable companies to foreigners. In doing this,
governments tried to solve their financial problems so we have large inflow of FDI
and recession at the same time.
The second factor that may have influenced the analysis is the nature of FDI,
especially in the first half of 1990s, but later as well. FDI was in most cases
privatisation related, and market and resource seeking. This meant just change of
ownership, and funds that governments received were largely used to cover budget
deficits. Furthermore, companies that were sold to foreigners were already solid and
profit making, recording above average productivity, e.g. telecommunication sector
or oil industry sector. In many cases these industries were monopolies, so the new
owners reaped the benefits of this position, which is unlikely in developed countries.
Such FDI did not contribute to technology transfer and diffusion to a greater extent,
and the spillover effect was marginal.
It should be further noted that in the case of privatisation of monopolies prior to
implementing effective regulatory authority might simply replace a government
monopoly with a private monopoly, even more ruthless in exploiting the consumers
(Stiglitz, 2002).
The third factor was the speed of privatisation. Countries, which privatised faster,
received greater FDI inflow than those with slower privatisation. This does not
necessarily mean that privatisation-lagging countries were worse off. On the
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contrary, e.g. Slovenia and Poland had a very slow pace of the privatisation process.
There was no rush too sell off the most valuable assets. Slovenia is the best
performing transition economy and under the World Bank classification is the only
high-income country in the region. Furthermore, the FDI inflow into Slovenia was
very modest during the observed period. However, performance of the economy did
not suffer because of that fact. On the other hand, Hungary, Poland and Czech
Republic received significant portion of FDI inflow for the region, which positively
influenced their economies. It should be noted that size of countries played a role,
which makes differences between Slovenia and aforementioned countries more
understandable.
Additionally, in the ten-year review of transition provided by the World Bank, it
became apparent that the process of privatisation in the absence of institutional
infrastructure had no positive effect on growth (Stiglitz, 2002).
The fifth issue is collection of FDI data. The problem is that cross-border merger
and acquisitions are not captured under FDI. Thus, there may be significant foreign
capital inflow that is not recorded as FDI. The drop in FDI during the late 1990s is
contributed largely to increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions5.
It seems that FDI in 1990s was not aiming at efficiency, but rather at market
penetration. It is expected that FDI in the following decade will be much more
efficiency seeking driven, giving advantage to countries with sound and long-run
reaching reforms, and with solid infrastructure. Countries with sound legal systems
that protect investors are likely to see more FDI and of a better ‘quality’.
One issue that will be of interest, especially in coming years, is the influence of
FDI on balance of payments. As FDI ‘settles in’, which may take few years, the
pressures to withdraw profits will grow stronger, thus putting additional pressure to
the capital account. This activity may diminish benefits of FDI on local economy in
medium and long run. This does not suggest that FDI is unwelcome, but rather states
that there are some negative consequences of FDI as well along with all positive
consequences for economies.
According to the IMF, countries that engaged in the shock therapy might feel
some pain in the short run, but benefits would be felt in the long run. Gradualist
policies in countries like Hungary, Slovenia and Poland have yielded less pain in the
short-run, greater social and political stability, and faster growth in the long run. ‘In
the race between the tortoise and the hare, it appears that the tortoise has won again.
The radical reformers, whether the star pupils like the Czech Republic or the slightly
unruly ones like Russia, have lost’ (Stiglitz, 2002: 188).
The results for R&D analysis are provided in table 2. The time series length is
chosen very simple: the availability of the data. Since prior to 1995 many countries
have no recorded data, we may say that the analysis was done using data manly
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between 1995 and 2002. In all our equations we have estimated unbalanced panels,
which, in addition to first differencing, reduces the number of data points available.
Table 2: Analysis of R&D in CEE, 1990-2002
































































Notes: Figures in brackets are respective standard error values. A single asterisk denotes an
estimated coefficient, which is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level, and
double asterisk denotes significance at the 1 per cent level. Autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity were tested using Breusch-Pegan and Breusch-Godfrey tests respectively.
In all equations we did not detect autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity.
Testing for unit root was done using the Fisher type unit root test for panel data developed by
Maddala and Wu (1999), using Phillips-Perron procedure. Test results showed variables to be
stationary.
The hypothesis that R&D has a positive influence on GDP has a positive outcome.
Even though there are great limitations for estimating such equation for selected
countries that are not considered to be on a technology frontier, it does point out to a
positive influence of R&D. Since performing R&D is not only about being on the
frontier but also being able to transfer knowledge and best practices from the frontier
countries.
What about lags in R&D activity? As stipulated throughout this text, there is
considerable time lag between actual research expenditures and actual invention or
innovation. This lag is larger for basic research, if it is possible to talk about lags since
benefits may be accrued after considerable number of years. On the other hand,
applied research is estimated to have a lag of three to five years. Even though the time
span is rather short we managed to retrieve some conclusions from the lagged
variables. As can be seen from the table above in first four equations we have
estimated R&D with no lag, with one, two and finally four lags. Even though the
estimated coefficients do not have separate significance for all variables of R&D,
they do exhibit joint significance (10% or 5%) in all equations. Due to shortness of
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the data period the analysis was constrained to three lags only. We can observe from
the table above that the second lag performs much better then the other lag. Thus we
may conclude that the second lag has the highest explanatory power. With third lag
we get a negative value, but this coefficient is not significant.
We can conclude that the performance of R&D does come with a lag. However,
due to data limitations we managed to explore up to three lags. This does not
invalidate our conclusions of three to five years lag, but rather confirms the
hypothesis of a lag in R&D activity. With more data in coming years we will be able
to estimate R&D process more thoroughly.
Even with obvious limitations to the data, it may be concluded that there are
benefits to performing R&D in transition economies. This is more of essence when
we think of past educational levels in the sample countries, which are relatively high.
All this may contribute to further and faster appropriate technology transfer. Along
these lines we may say that increased R&D activity may have positive influence on
catch-up process.
Conclusion
The findings of this research suggest that technology transfer, as measured by FDI,
does not contribute to output to a great extent, and certainly it is not found to be more
influential than domestic investment. However, we cannot disregard importance of
FDI that is likely to surface after the privatisation process is completed in respective
countries.
The findings of direct measures of technology in terms of R&D, we find that that
there is a positive relationship of R&D to output, however, this research mostly
facilitates appropriate technology transfer for selected countries rather than creation
of new technologies, since selected countries are not at the technology frontier.
In general we can conclude that technology plays a role in growth and
development of selected transition economies. However, channels of importance of
selected indicators differ from technology frontier countries.
NOTES
1 John Wilkinson eliminated gaps between piston and cylinders, which have previously been stuffed
with rags.
2 William Murdock provided the sun and planet gearing system that actually made it possible to have
rotary force.
3 Research on 108 US firms.
4 For further analysis on the role of exports see Salvatore and Hatcher (1991).
5 See World Investment Report (2000)
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